Introduction
Dialogues on Maritime Athens’ is a by-design research project that specifically explores the remaking of the contemporary maritime Athenian image as presented through perennial myths and drawings, through the dialogue of five figures, establishing an interplay between Plato’s (linear) model of selection and Deleuze’s (chaotic) model of coexistence.1
‘To read diffractively, to highlight an intratextual reality.’2
Throughout this research, there has always been an unsuccessful attempt to fuse the voices of myth and reality into a single cohesive textual piece. For example, in Dialogues on Maritime Athens, the voices vary: figures recite their own maritime accounts, design methods that construct liquid grounds and transparent lighthouses are thoroughly described (by this author), while at the same time two philosophers dispute over the idea of the model, the copy and the simulacrum. Although each voice is valid in its own right, no clear hierarchy dictates which one should lead.
Rick Dolphin refers to diffractive reading as an action which results in “new thought”. He positions reading not as a passive response to the texts, but rather as way of confronting them, tearing them apart and constructing an intertextual reality (as he calls it) superior to the two texts that generated it. In his paper THE LAND AND US a diffractive reading of marx and serres on “sense” and “the common”, Marx reappears through Serres and Serres reappears through Marx – one is re-read through the other and thus altered through the other. To read diffractively then, poses an interesting method where instead of combining the voices, they are rigorously distinguished, forming multiple dialogic relationships, without any clear sequence, that may lead to new epiphanies.
Dialogues on Maritime Athens is an experiment where the text is deliberately broken in two[EM1] . Contrary to Dolphin’s diffractive reading, the split does not occur between authors, but rather between realms: that of myth and that of reality. One speaks of stories, memories and intangible architecture, the other speaks of theories, ideas and forms; the one is filled with lightness, while the other is heavy and complex; both however use a series of terms that constantly (re)appear: the figure, the copy, difference, transparency etc. are words that are copied across, becoming objects of diffraction which (according to physics) ‘bend the light that passes through them.’ These terms-objects are solid and permanent - the stable parts within each text. Their meaning may shift and vary but they remain constant. Through them the dialogue flows but each time it bends, contorts and distorts, always however speaking of a Maritime Athenian image.
1 The juxtaposition of the two philosophers derives from Gilles Deleuze and Rosalind Krauss, “Plato and the Simulacrum” in October, Vol.27,1983: 47. doi: 10.2307/778495
2 Rick Dolphijn, “The Land and Us.” Angelaki 29, no. 4 (July 3, 2024): 98–107. doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2024.2382603.
Aknowledgements
This body of work is part of a larger design PhD Annual Review thesis titled ‘Composing Dialogues: Tu(r)ning Plato’s Myth of Atlantis Towards Contemporary Athens’.
eikones: from Ancient Greek εἰκών (eikṓn, “likeness, image, portrait”) – the copy
phantasmes: from Ancient Greek φᾰντᾰ́ζω (phantázō, “make visible”) – the simulacrum
In “Plato and the Simulacrum,” Gilles Deleuze asks what does it mean to ‘overthrow Platonism’, as Nietzsche prompts? Deleuze describes Plato’s motive as “to distinguish essence from appearance, the intelligible from the sensible, the Idea from the image, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum.”3 Plato views the simulacrum not merely as a false copy, but rather as a copy that has lost its essence. Deleuze, in his attempts to overthrow Platonism, brings all copies into coexistence by ‘raising up’ the simulacra, removing any hierarchy between original and copy.
Plato claims there are two kinds of copies: the good copies are the ones that bare an authentic, true resemblance to the Idea (the model), and the bad copies or the simulacra, which appear as true but are actually pretenders that claim a false resemblance to the Idea and thus, he wishes to discard them. Friedrich Nietzsche was the first to try and invert Platonism by re-evaluating Plato’s attempt to distinguish between an ideal world and an “inferior” one filled with appearances. He introduces the concept of the ‘eternal return’4, where those “lesser” world copies are repeatedly compared with each other, instead of being sorted and discarded. Reading Nietzsche, Deleuze proceeds by bringing all copies into coexistence, ‘raising up’ the simulacra and removing any hierarchy between original and copy. He claims that the simulacrum is no longer seen as a copy different in degree but rather different in nature, detaching it from the rest of the copies and constructing a different type of model, in which phantasms (simulacra) are seen as having their own identity – a difference between differences.
Plato claims there are two kinds of copies: the good copies are the ones that bare an authentic, true resemblance to the Idea (the model), and the bad copies or the simulacra, which appear as true but are actually pretenders that claim a false resemblance to the Idea and thus, he wishes to discard them. Friedrich Nietzsche was the first to try and invert Platonism by re-evaluating Plato’s attempt to distinguish between an ideal world and an “inferior” one filled with appearances. He introduces the concept of the ‘eternal return’4, where those “lesser” world copies are repeatedly compared with each other, instead of being sorted and discarded. Reading Nietzsche, Deleuze proceeds by bringing all copies into coexistence, ‘raising up’ the simulacra and removing any hierarchy between original and copy. He claims that the simulacrum is no longer seen as a copy different in degree but rather different in nature, detaching it from the rest of the copies and constructing a different type of model, in which phantasms (simulacra) are seen as having their own identity – a difference between differences.
Perhaps, for Deleuze, the overthrowing of Platonism might have opened up different avenues for contemporary philosophy. He characterizes Platonism as “crippling”, since it is the foundation for the traditional dualist epistemologies carried through the Enlightenment within Cartesianism. According to Deleuze, Platonism lacks creativity by being too linear and rigid. For Plato however, his will to select and sort out allegedly stems from living within the structure of the Athenian society: a democratic context in which anyone has claim in anything. The philosopher wants to therefore distinguish between the authentic and inauthentic claimants, believing that within this society of good men, also exists ‘the charlatan, the counterfeiter, the buffoon and the satyr: the one who claims to everything, and who, in laying such claims to everything, is never grounded but contradicts everything, including himself.’5
For Plato, distinguishing between the copy and the simulacrum is ultimately a quest of the moral, the true – and I would argue – the ideal, especially when it comes to Athens. The city’s “truth” is constantly challenged through Plato’s work (the Laws, the Republic, Critias). In Critias for example, the city appears as a model (primeval Athens), as a copy (prosperous Atlantis) as well as a simulacrum (corrupted Atlantis).
In the Athenian contemporary setting, if we choose to follow Plato’s strict, linear and hierarchical model of selection, we will be sorting and discarding past Athenian image-copies in hope of reaching Athens’ “truth”. On the other hand, Deleuze’s model presents a different type of challenge – that of acceptance.
For Plato, distinguishing between the copy and the simulacrum is ultimately a quest of the moral, the true – and I would argue – the ideal, especially when it comes to Athens. The city’s “truth” is constantly challenged through Plato’s work (the Laws, the Republic, Critias). In Critias for example, the city appears as a model (primeval Athens), as a copy (prosperous Atlantis) as well as a simulacrum (corrupted Atlantis).
In the Athenian contemporary setting, if we choose to follow Plato’s strict, linear and hierarchical model of selection, we will be sorting and discarding past Athenian image-copies in hope of reaching Athens’ “truth”. On the other hand, Deleuze’s model presents a different type of challenge – that of acceptance.
Since no image is inferior, since all simulacra are now equal, there is no need for a model to judge copies against. Within that plane of coexistence, past copies simply exist, their difference revealed and ultimately accepted, since it is not viewed as inferior or problematic but rather as the container of a different type of “truth”.
3Gilles Deleuze and Rosalind Krauss, “Plato and the Simulacrum” in October, Vol.27,1983: 47. doi: 10.2307/778495
4The concept of the Eternal Return states that time repeats itself. In this context, Friedrich Nietzsche uses it to challenge Plato’s linear model of selection. See Deleuze and Krauss, Plato and the Simulacrum, 54.
5David Lane, “Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss” in SubStance 40, no. 2 (2011): 109.
3Gilles Deleuze and Rosalind Krauss, “Plato and the Simulacrum” in October, Vol.27,1983: 47. doi: 10.2307/778495
4The concept of the Eternal Return states that time repeats itself. In this context, Friedrich Nietzsche uses it to challenge Plato’s linear model of selection. See Deleuze and Krauss, Plato and the Simulacrum, 54.
5David Lane, “Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss” in SubStance 40, no. 2 (2011): 109.
eidolon: from Ancient Greek εἴδωλον (eídōlon, “model, figure, representation”) – the model
mimesis: from Ancient Greek μιμεῖσθαι (mimeîsthai, “to imitate”)
Plato creates the method of division, to distinguish between the copy and the simulacrum. ‘He divides the thing into an ontological lineage or genos.’6 Through the process of dialectical exchange, i.e., logos of sorting and discarding, he wishes to arrive to the definition of a specific Idea. For example, in the Sophist, he defines the genos of the Sophist, presenting the angler as a paradigm that can be closely related to him. He sees the angler as a technites – a maker who possesses techne. However, he asks, ‘is techne an expertise of production or of acquisition?’ The latter is chosen as more appropriate to the angler. Acquisition is then split into acquisition by seizing or by exchange. The first is chosen and then examined as seizing by force or seizing by subterfuge. The dialogue continues until the process of division can no longer proceed. Division occurs through constant repetition7, when two claimants are judged repeatedly, in a linear order against the model (the Idea).
In order to establish the criteria against which the claimants are set, Plato constructs a myth – a ground, a foundation through which the Idea (the model) is narrated, a model against which the different claimants are judged.8 He uses myth in the dialectic itself and tests out the claimants, measuring the degree to which they resemble or imitate the model. The Stateman for instance, is a mythical narrative that sets up a collection of criteria that determine the Idea of a good governance and a good polis. First, Plato constructs the figure of a god-ruler (eidolon, model), gradually revealing other secondary figures such as the political man or the auxiliaries (eikones, good copies) that hold true resemblance to the model, followed by charlatans and frauds (phantasms, bad copies, simulacra) that are false pretenders filled with deception and
In order to establish the criteria against which the claimants are set, Plato constructs a myth – a ground, a foundation through which the Idea (the model) is narrated, a model against which the different claimants are judged.8 He uses myth in the dialectic itself and tests out the claimants, measuring the degree to which they resemble or imitate the model. The Stateman for instance, is a mythical narrative that sets up a collection of criteria that determine the Idea of a good governance and a good polis. First, Plato constructs the figure of a god-ruler (eidolon, model), gradually revealing other secondary figures such as the political man or the auxiliaries (eikones, good copies) that hold true resemblance to the model, followed by charlatans and frauds (phantasms, bad copies, simulacra) that are false pretenders filled with deception and
trickery. By employing the method of division, he is then able to distinguish auxiliaries from the charlatans according to their level of resemblance to the Idea.
In contrast, Deleuze views the simulacrum as a copy that is not inferior, but rather unlocks ‘a mimetic chaos, in which all identity has been expunged, and where resemblances give way to pure repetitions.’9 The difference between the simulacrum is no longer a criterion through which the simulacrum is sorted and discarded but is rather celebrated by Deleuze because it equates all the simulacra. He views mimesis as a positive force that cancels all models, in order to purge all traces of resemblance and give way to pure repetition. In that sense then, the foundational myth is no longer the sole foundation-ground that holds the copies and the simulacra. Rather, this model of simultaneous coexistence ‘swallows up all foundations’ leading to a universal “un-founding.”10
Both Plato and Deleuze operate through the power of mimesis11. For the former, mimesis is hierarchical, used to choose one copy over the other, following the criteria of the mythical, foundational ground. For the latter, mimesis is repetitional, cancelling any sort of resemblant advantage. Once again, if we follow the Platonic method, in search of Athens’ “truth”, we might need to construct a new, foundational myth – perhaps a contemporary Critias – and afterwards, through logos, we would be able to distinguish between true and false claimants. The Deleuzian path, however, no longer requires the creation of myth, but rather the gathering and collection of all copies (ideal, mythical, real, true, false) in a way in which they can be viewed as equal.
In contrast, Deleuze views the simulacrum as a copy that is not inferior, but rather unlocks ‘a mimetic chaos, in which all identity has been expunged, and where resemblances give way to pure repetitions.’9 The difference between the simulacrum is no longer a criterion through which the simulacrum is sorted and discarded but is rather celebrated by Deleuze because it equates all the simulacra. He views mimesis as a positive force that cancels all models, in order to purge all traces of resemblance and give way to pure repetition. In that sense then, the foundational myth is no longer the sole foundation-ground that holds the copies and the simulacra. Rather, this model of simultaneous coexistence ‘swallows up all foundations’ leading to a universal “un-founding.”10
Both Plato and Deleuze operate through the power of mimesis11. For the former, mimesis is hierarchical, used to choose one copy over the other, following the criteria of the mythical, foundational ground. For the latter, mimesis is repetitional, cancelling any sort of resemblant advantage. Once again, if we follow the Platonic method, in search of Athens’ “truth”, we might need to construct a new, foundational myth – perhaps a contemporary Critias – and afterwards, through logos, we would be able to distinguish between true and false claimants. The Deleuzian path, however, no longer requires the creation of myth, but rather the gathering and collection of all copies (ideal, mythical, real, true, false) in a way in which they can be viewed as equal.
6Derek Hampson, “Deleuze/Heidegger: Motivation and Method in Plato’s Search for the Simulacrum” in Epoché Magazine, November 26, 2021. - define genos
7Daniel W. Smith “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism.” in Continental Philosophy Review 38, no. 1–2, July 10, 2006: 96. doi.org/10.1007/s11007-006-3305-8. – define the model of repetition
8Smith, The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism.
9David Lane in “Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss.” SubStance 40, no. 2 (2011): 105–26, 110.
10Smith, The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism, 114.
11Lane, Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss.
7Daniel W. Smith “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism.” in Continental Philosophy Review 38, no. 1–2, July 10, 2006: 96. doi.org/10.1007/s11007-006-3305-8. – define the model of repetition
8Smith, The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism.
9David Lane in “Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss.” SubStance 40, no. 2 (2011): 105–26, 110.
10Smith, The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism, 114.
11Lane, Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss.
BIBILIOGRAPHY
Deleuze, Gilles and Krauss, Rosalind. “Plato and the Simulacrum” in October, Vol.27 (1983):
45-56. doi: 10.2307/778495
Cassano, Franco, Norma Bouchard, and Valerio Ferme. Southern Thought and Other Essays on the Mediterranean. USA: Fordham University Press, 2012.
45-56. doi: 10.2307/778495
Cassano, Franco, Norma Bouchard, and Valerio Ferme. Southern Thought and Other Essays on the Mediterranean. USA: Fordham University Press, 2012.
Lane, David. “Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe on the Reversal of Platonism: The Mimetic Abyss.” SubStance 40, no. 2 (2011): 105-126.
Plato. Timaeus and Critias. Translated by Desmond Lee, T. K. Johansen. 3rd edition. London, United Kingdom: Penguin Classics, 2008.
Plato. Timaeus and Critias. Translated by Desmond Lee, T. K. Johansen. 3rd edition. London, United Kingdom: Penguin Classics, 2008.
Smith, Daniel W. “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism.” Continental Philosophy Review 38, no. 1–2 (July 10, 2006): 89-123. doi. org/10.1007/s11007-006-3305-8.